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Food-supply chains have become extensively vertically coordinated through the use of contracts as an organizational 
response to satisfy the needs of consumers in the saturated food markets of the industrialized countries. The contracts 
involved must establish an optimal trade-off between incentive provision and risk reduction. Agency theory can be 
used to model this trade-off. We show how to do this in a three-stage (producer, wholesaler, retailer) principal-agent 
supply-chain model. Its application to the Dutch supply chain of ware potatoes shows that during the period 1961–2002, 
retailers have been able to provide more incentives to the wholesalers and producers and as a consequence the costs 
of coordination in the supply chain decreased.
Food-supply chains are facing a transition from 
using open-market mechanisms for coordinating 
the various stages of value-adding (e.g., produc-
tion, wholesale, retail) to negotiated coordination 
involving governance forms such as alliances, 
joint ventures, contracts, franchising agreements, 
and vertical integration (e.g., Boehlje, Hofﬁ ng, and 
Schroeder 1999). A driving force behind this integra-
tion is the need to coordinate the timing and quality 
of purchases and deliveries along the supply chain. 
Perishability of products caused early integration, 
but other factors—relating to economies of scale in 
the management of information about consumers 
and their preferences, for example—reinforced the 
trend (e.g., Johnson and Berdegué 2004). 
In particular, the rise of mega-processors and 
mega-retailers has resulted in very little produce 
being traded on the open market. Often, the com-
petitiveness of these enterprises is strengthened 
through strict grades and standards imposed on the 
producer-suppliers through contracts. Contracts 
provide the contracting parties a certain level of con-
trol and risk sharing and are often used to improve 
quality and/or performance through incentive struc-
tures (e.g. Curtis and McCluskey 2003; Milgrom 
and Roberts 1992). As such, vertical coordination 
through contracting can be seen as an organizational 
response to an increased demand for quality among 
increasingly discerning consumers (Wolf, Hueth, 
and Ligon 2001). The resulting market orientation 
implies adjusting production processes and prod-
ucts to respond to speciﬁ c consumer demands and 
to market signals and trends. In contrast, product 
orientation, based on the principles that good prod-
ucts sell themselves and should be standardized to 
keep costs down, becomes less suitable now that 
consumer food markets in industrialized countries 
have become saturated, international competition is 
growing, and food companies must concomitantly 
meet the rising demand for product differentia-
tion and sustainable production. Wholesalers and 
processors are important economic actors that link 
producers with the needs and wants of the consum-
ers as articulated by the large, powerful retailers. 
To become successful, such a link has to solve the 
problems of information asymmetry and incentive 
incompatibility between the trading parties. Of 
these, the producers have more information about 
their own efforts than those of the wholesalers and 
the retailers, and if the producers obtain a ﬁ xed 
wage, they want to keep costs down at the expense 
of quality and/or product differentiation, while the 
retailers ask for quality and differentiated products 
to satisfy consumers’ needs. 
Given its focus on developing contracts that 
align incentives while at the same time addressing 
monitoring issues, this paper employs principal-
agent theory to address the issues of coordination 
and risk-aversion in an integrated food-supply-
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chain model consisting of three stages: producers, 
wholesalers/processors, and retailers. The key idea 
within agency theory is that principal-agent rela-
tionships should reﬂ ect efﬁ cient information and 
risk-bearing costs, incentive alignments, and the 
contract as the unit of analysis (e.g., Cook and Barry 
2004). An agency problem arises if the risk-averse 
agent (e.g., producer and/or wholesaler/processor) 
is assigned decision (or control) rights (e.g., re-
garding production, distribution, processing) that 
affect the principal’s (e.g., retailer and consumer) 
wealth or utility function. The principal cannot fully 
observe the effort of the agent, and hence is not 
sure whether or not the agent acts according to the 
best interest of the principal when the goals of the 
principal and the agent conﬂ ict. Moreover, simply 
assigning claims to the residual income generated 
by the asset as an incentive to the agent to act in the 
interest of the principal does not go without the cost 
of more risk on the part of the agent who is then 
asking for a higher risk-premium. 
Principal-agent theory applies in all cases 
where one party has an informational advantage 
over another that can be exploited to the beneﬁ t of 
the advantaged party at the expense of the advan-
taged party’s trading partner (Salanié 1997). Given 
agency problems, we cannot expect a supply chain 
to function as well economically as it would if all 
information were shared without any cost involved 
or if the incentives of principal and agent could be 
cost aligned. This shortfall is called “agency costs” 
(Cook and Barry 2004). Those costs may include 
ex ante search costs (associated with adverse-selec-
tion [hidden-information] problems) and/or ex post 
monitoring and enforcement costs (associated with 
moral hazard (hidden action) problems) (e.g. Sykuta 
and Cook 2001; Douma and Schreuder 2002). This 
paper shows how to estimate these agency costs in 
a food-supply chain. Its main contribution in this 
respect is the extension of the widely elaborated 
two-stage principal-agent model into a three-stage 
(e.g., producer, wholesaler, retailer) supply-chain 
framework. After deriving the model, an empirical 
illustration is provided for the Dutch supply chain 
of ware potatoes.
Three-Stage Supply-Chain Principal-Agent 
Model
Consider a product that is produced by producers, 
processed and distributed by wholesalers, and ﬁ -
nally sold to the consumers by retailers. Let x denote 
the retail value of the product. This value can be 
decomposed as x = e + ε, where e is the retail value 
as expected at the time when the producers take 
their production decision and ε is the unexpected 
component with mean zero and variance σ2. The 
retailers purchase the product from the wholesalers 
by offering them the linear contract W w = αwx + βw, 
where W w is the retailers’ payment to the wholesal-
ers, 0 ≤ αw ≤ 1 is the retail-value sharing rate, and βw 
is a ﬁ xed payment. In turn, the wholesalers purchase 
the product from the producers by offering them 
the linear contract Wp = αpαwx + βp with 0 ≤ αp ≤ 1 
and ﬁ xed payment βp. The effort of the wholesalers 
(producers) comes at a cost Cw = 0.5cwe
2 + dw (Cp 
= 0.5cpe
2 + dp), where cw > 0 (cp > 0) and dw (dp) is 
a deterministic term. Finally, while the retailers, 
who are carrying a broad assortment of products, 
are assumed to be risk-neutral, the wholesalers and 
producers are allowed to be risk-averse. 
The proﬁ t of the producers is Πp = W p − Cp = 
αpαwx + βp − 0.5cpe2 − dp. Hence the unexpected 
proﬁ t component is Πw − E(Πw) = αwαpε so that 
Var(Πw) = (αwαp)2σ2. The objective function for 
proﬁ t maximization can be expressed on the basis of 
the expected mean-variance (EV) model, and hence 
the producers maximize the certainty equivalent of 
their proﬁ t CEp = E(Πp) − 0.5ρpVar(Πp) by choos-
ing the optimal level of effort value e, where ρp is 
the risk-aversion coefﬁ cient if ρp ≥ 0 (Kahl 1983).1 
The optimal solution is the incentive constraint 
e = αwαp/cp, which clearly shows the incentive 
mechanism of αwαp. Nevertheless, the certainty 
equivalent of the opportunity cost of the produc-
ers, denoted by Op, forces the wholesalers to pay 
the producers a little more than Op, which is simply 
approximated by the participation constraint CEp = 
Op. From this condition the wholesalers can derive 
that they have to pay a ﬁ xed compensation to the 
producers as given by βp = Op + dp − 0.5(αwαp)2/cp 
+ 0.5ρp(αwαp)2σ2. 
Now the wholesalers can determine αp by maxi-
mizing their certainty equivalent CEw = E(Πw) − 
0.5ρwVar(Πw) = E(W w − W p − Cw) − 0.5ρwVar(Πw) 
= αw(1 − αp)e + βw − βp − Cw − 0.5ρwαw2(1 − αp)2σ2 
for αp given the conditions for e and βp as derived 
1 For the conditions that justify the use of the EV model and 
the discussion of the EV model and the general expected-utility 
model, the reader is referred to Bigelow (1993) and Meyer and 
Rasch (1992). 
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above. The result is the incentive intensity principle 
αp = (1 + cpσ
2ρw)/[1 + cpσ2(ρw + ρp) + cw/cp], which 
shows that, when neglecting the marginal wholesale 
cost (i.e., cw = 0), simply giving full incentives to 
the producers by setting αp = 1 is not optimal if they 
are risk-averse (ρp > 0) and cannot be monitored on 
their precise effort (σ2 > 0).
Finally, the retailers can determine αw by maxi-
mizing their expected proﬁ t E(Πr) = e − E(W w) = (1 
− αw)e − βw for αw given the incentive condition for 
e as presented above and the condition βw = Ow + dw 
+ Op + dp − αw
2αp/cp + 0.5ρp(αwαp)2σ2 + 0.5ρwαw2(1 
− αp)
2σ2 as can be derived from the participation 
constraint CEw = Ow, where Ow is the certainty 
equivalent of the opportunity cost of the wholesal-
ers. The result is the incentive-intensity principle: 
αw = 1/{1 + cw/cp + cpσ
2(ρp + [(1 − αp)/αp]2ρw)}αp, 
which will be equal to one if the risk-aversion coef-
ﬁ cients ρp and ρw are zero and/or no unobservability 
or risk is involved (σ2 > 0).
Having time-series data available on x, e, Ww, Wp, 
Ow and Op, we can estimate σ
2 by computing Var(x 
− e) and estimate αp, the deterministic components 
dp and dw and the cost function parameters cw and 
cp in the nonlinear-equation system Wp − Op = dp + 
cpex + 0.5αpe + 0.5(cp/αp − 3cp − cw)e
2 and Ww − Ow 
− Op − 0.5e = dw + dp + (cp/αp)e(x − e) as implied 
by the linear-payment contracts, that is, W w = αwx 
+ βw and Wp = αwαpx + βp, and the incentive, par-
ticipation, and incentive-compatibility constraints. 
With these estimates, the incentive constraint and 
the two participation and incentive-compatibility 
constraints there are ﬁ ve equations with ﬁ ve un-
knowns: αw, βp, βw, ρp, and ρw. Their solutions can 
be seen as the estimates of the model. The estimate 
for αw is αw = cpe/αp. Given that e is a time-varying 
variable and cp and αp are constant parameters, αw 
will be time-varying as well. The solutions βp = Op 
+ dp + 0.5αpe + 0.5(cp/αp − 3cp − cw)e
2, βw = Ow + Op 
+ dw + dp + 0.5e − (cp/αp)e
2, ρp = (αp2 − 2αpcpe + cpe 
− αpcwe)/αpcp
2σ2e, and ρw = αp(αp − cpe)/cp2σ2e(1 − 
αp) also allow for time-varying values.
The validity of the model can be evaluated by 
comparing the actual payments Wp and Ww over 
time with their respective estimates αwx + βw and 
αpαwx + βp. If the model performs well, it can be 
used to estimate the agency costs by setting ρw = 
ρp = 0 so that αp* = 1/(1 + cw/cp) and αw* = 1, by 
which 1/(cw + cp) is found as the estimate of the 
expected ﬁ rst-best Pareto-optimal retail value e*. 
Consequently, the expected ﬁ rst-best Pareto-optimal 
proﬁ ts become E(Πr*) = 0.5/(cw + cp) − Ow − Op − 
dw − dp, E(Πw*) = Ow + 3cp/2(cw + cp)
2 and E(Πp*) 
= Op − 3cp/2(cw + cp)
2. The differentials E(Πr*) − 
E(Πr), E(Πw*) − E(Πw) and E(Πp*) − E(Πp) are the 
estimated agency costs for the retailers, wholesal-
ers, and producers, respectively. Notice that these 
estimates are maximum levels because they are 
based on the assumption that the higher e* could 
have been realized in the consumer market.
Empirical Application
Every year, some eight million tons of potatoes 
are produced in the Netherlands, mainly on family 
farms. About half are ware potatoes, approximately 
20 percent are seed potatoes, and the remaining 30 
percent are potatoes grown for starch. Most ware 
potatoes are sold to wholesalers. A negligible 
amount is sold directly by the producers to the 
retailers. Most of the wholesale trade has become 
concentrated in relatively few hands, as the major 
users—particularly the large retailers, processors, 
and export markets—demand large quantities with 
tight speciﬁ cations which only the larger wholesal-
ers can meet. Because of this development in the 
market, the need has arisen to procure potatoes be-
fore harvest, and hence contractual arrangements to 
do so have emerged. In turn, growers see contracts 
as a way to reduce price risk. Spot-market prices 
tend to ﬂ uctuate largely from one year to another due 
to weather and disease issues, the level of imports, 
and domestic and export demand. Although retailers 
(wholesalers) may gain knowledge of wholesalers’ 
(growers’) ability through the use of quality mea-
surement, wholesalers’ (growers’) investments, as 
well as weather and disease conditions, this is not 
sufﬁ cient to derive, without uncertainty, wholesal-
ers’ (growers’) actual level of effort from the retail-
ers’ turnover. Wholesalers’ and growers’ interest in 
hedging on the futures market supports the assertion 
that they might be risk-averse.
For our empirical analysis, Statistics Nether-
lands provided us with annual data over the period 
1961–2002 for the farm, export (i.e., wholesale), 
and retail prices (Euro/kg) of ware potatoes, all de-
ﬂ ated by the consumer price index (1990 = 1.00); 
the area planted (1000 ha); the yield per hectare 
(100 kg/ha); and the rent price of land (Euro/ha), 
deﬂ ated by the consumer price index. From these 
variables, we obtain seven variables of interest. 
First, the output quantity q (million tons) is com-
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puted as the yield per hectare times the area planted 
(divided by 104). Given the retail price p, the retail 
value x is obtained as x = pq (billion Euro). Next, to 
compute the expected retail value e, we observe that 
the yield per hectare clearly shows a positive linear 
trend, so we use the ﬁ t of the linear trend as a proxy 
for the expected yield per hectare. Consequently, the 
expected output quantity is derived as the expected 
yield per hectare times the area planted (divided by 
104). Then we estimate the expected price as the 
ﬁ t of a univariate AR(3) model for the retail price 
(Euro/kg). Denoting these expectations as E(q) and 
E(p), then x = pq = E(p)E(q) + E(p)εq + εpE(q) + 
εpεq, where εp = p − E(p) and εq = q − E(q) are the 
unexpected components of p and q, respectively, 
and εpεq represents the covariance of p and q, which 
we may expect to be negative. Consequently, e = 
E(p)E(q) + Cov(p,q). To estimate e, we simply re-
gress x on a constant and E(p)E(q), and set e equal 
to the ﬁ t of the regression. In this way, e extracts 
all the information of interest out of εpεq, since the 
regression residuals are orthogonal to E(p)E(q). 
Furthermore, Wp (Ww) (billion Euro) is computed 
as the farm price (export price) times q. The rent 
price of land times the area planted (divided by 106) 
is used as a proxy for Op. Lastly, we set Ow equal 
to zero and use linear models with a constant and 
linear trend to estimate dw and dp.
The variables in the nonlinear-equation system 
appear to be trend-stationary. Hence the model is 
simply estimated in levels. The estimates for cw and 
cp are signiﬁ cant and positive: cw = 0.57 (t value = 
3.88) and cp = 0.24 (t value = 3.63). The respective 
equations explain 29% and 74% of the variance in 
Wp and Ww, respectively, and show a satisfying ﬁ t. 
The estimates of the key-factors in the model are 
presented in Table 1. They reveal that the incen-
tives to wholesalers and producers have increased 
over time: αw (αpαw) more than doubled from 0.28 
(0.16) in the 1960s to 0.63 (0.36) in 2000. This 
increase complies with the decrease in the risk-
aversion coefﬁ cients (ρp and ρw), of which the one 
for the producers (ρp) was negative from 1982 on. 
Moreover, the ﬁ xed payment βw (βp) of the retail-
ers (wholesalers) to the wholesalers (producers) as 
a percentage of retail turnover (x) decreased from 
50% (30%) in the 1960s to −16% (−23%) in 2002. 
These negative percentages come down to a total 
investment of 0.66 billion Euro by wholesalers and 
producers in their business relationship with the 
retailers in 2002. 
With increasingly negative ﬁ xed-payment levels 
compensated by higher retail-value sharing rates, 
wholesalers and producers are being exposed to 
more risk, since their rewards are contingent upon 
an increasing portion of the ﬁ nal retail value. But 
why do retailers let this happen? Transferring risk 
to upstream stages in the supply chain, which have 
fewer opportunities to spread risk compared with 
the large retailers and therefore ﬁ nd it more costly 
to bear, simply reduces the gains from trade. In 
contrast, retailers would prefer to bear the risk 
themselves (the wholesalers and, during the time 
that they were risk averse, the producers ask for 
a higher price as a compensation for the risk they 
bear) and extract the gains from this by lowering the 
price they pay to the wholesalers. Consequently, if 
retailers do transfer market-level risk to wholesalers 
and producers, as shown by the decreasing variance 
of the retailers’ proﬁ t compared to the increasing 
variance of wholesalers’ and producers’ proﬁ ts 
(Table 1), there must be another reason for doing 
so than mere risk aversion. 
“Chain reversal,” whereby traditional supply-ori-
ented chains are transformed into demand-oriented 
chains, offers a possible explanation why retailers 
wish to transfer risk to upstream stages in the supply 
chain, in spite of the higher risk-bearing costs. These 
higher risk-bearing costs might not outweigh the 
higher proﬁ ts the supply chain achieves when pro-
ducers and wholesalers are given more incentives 
to meet the delivery conditions that enable retailers 
to increasingly offer high value-added products that 
better satisfy the needs of the consumer than do the 
mainstream homogeneous products. And indeed, 
the required coordination efﬁ ciency in the supply 
of ware potatoes has been greatly improved, as can 
be seen from the fact that the agency costs (i.e., Ca = 
E(Πr* + Πw* + Πp*) − E(Πr + Πw + Πw)) decreased 
from 0.11 billion Euro in 1965, which was 16% of 
the total retail value (i.e., 100% × Ca/x) in 1965, 
to 0.05 billion Euro in 2002 (3% of the total retail 
value in 2002) (Table 1).
Conclusions
Food-supply chains have become extensively verti-
cally coordinated through the use of contracts as an 
organizational response to better satisfy the needs 
of consumers in the saturated food markets of the 
industrialized countries. Wholesalers often link 
producers with consumers’ needs as articulated by 
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the large, powerful retailers. The contracts involved 
must establish an optimal trade-off between incen-
tive provision and risk reduction. Agency theory can 
be used to model this trade-off; to do so we speciﬁ ed 
a three-stage (producer, wholesaler, retailer) prin-
cipal-agent supply-chain model for estimation and 
simulation purposes. Its application to the Dutch 
supply chain of ware potatoes shows that the costs 
of coordination in the supply chain decreased from 
0.11 billion Euro in 1965 to 0.05 billion Euro in 
2002, implying a reduction of 55%. This reduction 
complies with the ongoing process of chain reversal 
whereby the supply chain becomes more demand-
oriented as producers and wholesalers are given 
more incentives to enable retailers to increasingly 
carry high value-added products that better satisfy 
consumers’ needs.
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